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Abstract
Maynard, Bobbie Faye. M.A. The University of Memphis. 2015. Doomed to
Repeat It: Afghanistan, Media Framing, and the Loss of Historical Context. Major
Professor: Dr. Joseph Hayden.
The following research study explores the theory of framing as applied to the
examination of broadcast media coverage following the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, and leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. This thesis
provides an understanding of the role three American television networks, ABC, NBC,
and CBS, played in informing their audiences of the history behind the U.S.-Afghanistan
relationship. Evening news programs from each network were reviewed and coded
starting on September 11, 2001, through October 7, 2001, to determine the different
frames that were used. This data was compared with public opinion polls conducted by
the Pew Research Center for People and the Press during the same timeframe to examine
if whether or not any correlation between reporting and public opinion could be made.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
In the weeks that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the
United States, Americans turned to the news media to help them understand what was
happening and what it meant (Edy & Meirick, 2007). Who were the Taliban? Why did
they attack the United States? What was Islamic fundamentalism? What was the United
States’ relationship with Afghanistan? Even now, more than a decade after engaging the
Taliban in an ongoing war, the answers to these questions largely remain unclear to the
average American (Romano, 2011). A poll conducted in January 2014 found 51% of
Americans said it was the right decision to use military force in Afghanistan, while 41%
said it was the wrong decision. That is among the lowest levels of support for the original
decision to use force in Afghanistan since the Pew Research Center began asking the
question in 2006 (Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 2014).
Today, U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan, with President Barack Obama
extending the role of combat forces to keep fighting the Taliban and other militant groups
that threaten American soldiers or the Afghan government (Acosta & Ellis, 2014). Prior
to this extension, the President had called for a withdrawal of at least half of the
remaining 9,800 troops with a planned U.S. exit set for the end of 2016. This policy shift
came in large part due to the poor performance of Iraqi troops as the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria advances across Iraq and the election of new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani,
who welcomed an extended U.S. role more than his predecessor, Hamid Karzai (Carroll,
2014). The United States has had troops in Afghanistan for almost 14 years, following the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. To date, more than 2,300 American soldiers have
died in the conflict that has cost the U.S. more than $685 billion (Belasco, 2014).

	
  

	
  
Ultimately, when it comes to the issue of Afghanistan and the U.S. response to the
September 11 attacks, the issue is whether the American news media failed in their role
as the public’s watchdog or not. By providing a content analysis of broadcast media
coverage from the three network evening news programs on September 11 through the
start of the war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, this thesis makes an effort to provide
an understanding of the role the American broadcast news media played in attempting to
inform their audiences of the history behind the U.S.-Afghan relationship. This research
also seeks to examine how this might or might not have affected public opinion and even
foreign policy decisions as the country went to war (Asim, 2012).
This thesis explores the theory of framing and uses it to analyze the media
coverage. Framing is the process of “selecting and highlighting some aspects of a
perceived reality” and thereby “enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation
of that reality” (Entman, 2004, p. 26). Used here, the theory of framing is a tool to
analyze the coverage with special emphasis on what is not reported in the news, by
introducing the concept of exclusionary framing. This enhances the current understanding
of how frames can be influential, not only through deliberate methods of creation, but
also through the phenomenon of omission (Asim, 2012).
With this goal in mind, the researcher coded, analyzed, and organized the evening
news coverage of Afghanistan from ABC, NBC, and CBS starting on September 11,
2001, and ending with the beginning of the war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The
following thesis outlines the results of this study, beginning with a review of prior
research, historical context, and related theory
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The overall goals of this chapter were firstly to establish the significance of media
framing in regards to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, then to identify a place
where a new contribution could be made, specifically examining the use or lack thereof
of historical context in network television coverage leading up to the invasion of
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to reviewing the
theory of agenda setting, framing, prior wartime reporting, history of the U.S.-Afghan
relationship, and different methodologies used to examine framing and television
coverage so as to identify the appropriate approach for investigating the research
questions. Articles and prior research referenced herein were found by accessing the
online archives and databases of the University of Memphis’s library.
Agenda Setting
The ability of the news media to direct public attention to specific issues and
bring about top-of-mind awareness is an immense and well-documented influence. The
public not only obtains factual information from the news media, but readers, listeners,
and viewers also learn how much importance to attach to a topic on the basis of the
emphasis placed on it in the news coverage. This process is known as agenda setting.
Agenda setting illustrates a strong correlation between the emphases that mass media
place on certain issues through placement or amount of coverage and the importance
attributed to these issues by the audiences (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).
Previous studies (Lazarsfeld, Bernard, & Hazel, 1944) that laid the groundwork
for this topic include those conducted by Paul Lazarsfeld during World War II. Between
1940 and about 1960, Lazarsfeld and troops at the Bureau of Applied Social Research
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conducted a series of panel studies on the role of mass communications in the making of
decisions to vote, to buy, and choices regarding occupation (Lazarsfeld, Bernard, &
Hazel, 1944). His study put forth the idea that media effects were much more complex in
nature than previously assumed and that the constant stream of messages presented to
audiences could have strong, long-term effects (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).
The origins of agenda setting in political communication can be traced back to
Lippman’s (1922) observation that the news media filter reality (McCombs, 2004, p. 3).
Lippmann supported this argument by discussing how public opinions consist of pictures
inside men’s heads and why the picture “so often misleads men in their dealings with the
world outside” (Lippmann, 1922, p.18). He described how stereotypes affect public
opinions and how these individual opinions “are crystallized into what is called public
opinion” (Lippmann, 1922, p.19). Public opinions are the pictures inside men’s heads,
“the pictures of themselves, of others, of their needs, purposes, and relationship”
(Lippmann, 1922, p.18). Public opinion then consists of those pictures collectively acted
upon (Lippmann, 1922).
One of the most notable studies occurred in 1972 by Maxwell McCombs and
Donald Shaw concerning agenda-setting research in political communication. McCombs
and Shaw found that when the media increased their coverage of issues, the public cited
those issues as more pressing in their own lives (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). They
concluded that mass media influenced the assessment by voters of which were the biggest
and most prominent issues in a political campaign. The media managed to transfer their
own attitude on the importance of certain issues to the audience’s attitude by increasing
attention to those issues (Lozovina, Jurišić, & Lozovina, 2013).
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This landmark study of the agenda-setting effects of mass communication
represented a shift from work that focused on persuasion to studies that focused on earlier
stages of attitude formation and information acquisition (McCombs, 2004, pp. 2–4). It
also represented an end to the era of the minimal consequences of media effects. Agenda
setting in this tradition is the process by which the media transfer the salience of issues to
the public (Wolfe, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2013). The power of the press to set the public
agenda as first documented by McCombs and Shaw has been shown to be widespread
(Wolfe et al., 2013).
Delving further into the effects of agenda setting, Rogers and Dearing (1988)
described the mutual relationship of participants in the agenda-setting process. This
relationship is characterized as follows: the media strongly influence the audience’s
agenda; the media agenda has a strong and direct influence on the policy agenda, which
the media indirectly influence through the audience’s agenda, a sphere they also form and
reflect. Therefore, the mass media agenda-setting function is related to the formation of
public opinion (Lozovina, Jurišić, & Lozovina, 2013).
The growth in the studies of mass media effects has built on this foundation of
agenda setting and matured with the introduction of many approaches, including framing
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). These approaches were based on the idea that mass
media had potentially strong attitudinal effects, but that these effects also depended
closely on predispositions, thought and behavior patterns, and other characteristics of the
audience that influenced how they processed messages (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).
Media Framing
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One of the first comprehensive examinations of the theory of framing was
published in 1974 by Canadian sociologist and writer Erving Goffman. In this work,
Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, he posited that people
interpret what is going on around their world through their primary framework (Goffman,
1974). This framework is regarded as primary as it is taken for granted by the user.
Goffman defined two types of primary frameworks: natural and social, which both help
individuals to interpret data (Goffman, 1974).
Natural frameworks identify events as physical occurrences, not attributing any
social forces to the causation of events. On the other hand, social frameworks view events
as socially driven occurrences, because of the whims, goals, and manipulations on the
part of the other people or social players. Taken together, these frameworks and the
resulting frames they create in communication can influence how data is interpreted,
processed, and communicated (Goffman, 1974).
Framing is based on the assumption that how an issue is characterized in news
reports can have an influence on how it is understood by audiences (Scheufele &
Tewksbury, 2007). Following the agenda-setting theory, framing shows that the media
not only tells the public what prominent issues to think about but also how to think about
them. Therefore, the audience finds the issues pointed out by the media important, but
also accepts interpretative frames given to the issues by the media (Lozovina, Jurišić, &
Lozovina, 2013).
For journalists and reporters who shape media content, framing is a tool that
assists in reducing the complexity of an issue and adapting it to the parameters of the
medium where it is to be published or distributed (Lozovina, Jurišić, & Lozovina, 2013).
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It is also invaluable for efficiently presenting complex issues in a manner understandable
to the audience. Many definitions for framing exist. Framing has been described as a
“central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the
issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” or as “the
selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion in the
media agenda when a particular object is discussed,” (Weaver, 2007, p.143). It should
also be noted that frames can influence opinions by stressing specific values, facts, and
other considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than
they might appear to have under an alternative frame (Lozovina, Jurišić, & Lozovina,
2013).
Described by Entman (2004), as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events
or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular
interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (p.5). Entman noted the process of framing
selects some aspects of a perceived reality and makes them more accessible in a
communicating text. This is done in such a way as to promote a particular problem,
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for
the topic described (Entman, 2003).
Entman has defined two classes of framing: substantive and procedural. The focus
of this thesis includes substantive frames. These types of frames perform at least two of
the following basic functions in covering political events, issues, and actors: defining
effects or conditions as problematic, identifying causes, conveying a moral judgment, or
endorsing remedies or improvements (Entman, 2004). It should also be noted that a frame
in communication can be defined only in relation to a specific issue, event, or political
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actor (Chong & Druckman, 2007).
For many journalists and communicators, framing is a mode of presentation used
to convey information in a way that resonates with existing thought and behavior patterns
among their target audiences. Framing, for them, is a necessary tool to reduce the
complexity of an issue. Frames have become invaluable tools for presenting relatively
complex issues, such as foreign affairs, efficiently and in a way that makes them
accessible to lay audiences because they play to existing cognitive patterns (Scheufele &
Tewksbury, 2007). The presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases,
stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide reinforcement of
certain facts or judgments can provide documentation for frames (Reynolds & Barnett,
2003).
For the purposes of this thesis, the researcher made use of existing media frames
found in the work of communication scholars Patti M. Valkenburg and Holli A. Semetko
(2000). Valkenburg and Semetko have identified five news frames: conflict, human
interest, attribution of responsibility, morality, and economic consequences. The
researcher coded each broadcast segment according to these frame definitions.
According to Valkenburg and Semetko (2000), the conflict frame emphasizes
conflict between individuals, groups, institutions, or countries. The human-interest frame
brings a human face, an individual’s story, or an emotional angle to the presentation of an
event, issue, or problem. The responsibility frame presents an issue or problem in such a
way as to attribute responsibility for causing or solving them to either the government or
to an individual or group. The morality frame interprets an event or issue in the context of
religious tenets or moral prescriptions. Finally, the economic consequences frame
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presents an event, problem, or issue in terms of the financial penalties it will have on an
individual, group, institution, region, or country. These frame categories complement
Entman’s (2004) work on the functions of frames, which are defining effects or
conditions as problematic, identifying causes, conveying a moral judgment, or endorsing
remedies or improvements.
To understand how framing can impact the formation of public opinion, consider
the following process outlined by Shah, Watts, Domke, and Fan (2002). First, particular
frames and cues, defined as labels and terms used to identify aspects of the news, become
shared by political elites and journalists and grow commonplace in news coverage.
Secondly, these components of news discourse become particularly likely to be adopted
by the mass public in forming their evaluations of politicians and political issues,
fundamentally shifting the basis of judgment (Shah et al., 2002). For example, the classic
study by Nelson and colleagues shows how people’s policy attitudes and opinions toward
a proposed Ku Klux Klan rally differ depending on whether news coverage discusses the
rally as an issue of free speech or as an issue of public safety (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley,
1997).
The Events of September 11, 2001
As noted above, framing is most beneficial when used to reduce the complexity of
issues reported in the media and make them accessible to the general public. For the
purposes of this thesis, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the resulting U.S.
invasion of Afghanistan are examined, looking specifically at how the big three
American television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS, used frames to explain the terrorist
attacks. The sources of media examined were evening news broadcasts from ABC, NBC,
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and CBS, starting on September 11, 2001, through October 7, 2001, which marked the
beginning of the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
As described before, when it comes to foreign policy issues and the media, there
is a debate about how media cover foreign policy issues and policy conflicts (Lee, 2004).
In a democratic society, such as the United States, public opinion is often seen as playing
a large role in the development of governmental policy, and foreign affairs issues are part
of the public policy mix (Kiousis, Mitrook, Popescu, Shields, & Seltzer, 2006).
Additionally, there is a widespread belief that being informed on current events equates
to civic duty. Lacking personal contact with international events, the American public is
largely dependent on the news media’s presentation of foreign events. The less direct
exposure people have to a given issue, the more they rely on news media for information
and interpretation (Krishnaiah & Signorielli, 1993).
That was definitely true during and after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
which targeted symbols of U.S. military might and economic power. On that morning,
American Airlines Flight 11 departed Boston for Los Angeles, was hijacked, and crashed
into the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:45 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175
departed Boston for Los Angeles, was hijacked, and crashed into the South Tower of the
World Trade Center approximately 18 min. later. The South Tower collapsed in a plume
of ash and debris at approximately 10 a.m., and as people ran for their lives, the North
Tower collapsed at 10:27 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77 departed Washington Dulles
for Los Angeles, was hijacked, and crashed into the Pentagon at 9:43 a.m. United
Airlines Flight 93 departed Newark for San Francisco, was hijacked, and crashed into
Shanksville, PA., at 10:10 a.m. (Talbott & Chanda, 2001), thwarting the terrorists’ plans
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to crash this plane into the White House.
Previous War Framing and September 11, 2001
Because the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were broadcast live to
millions around the globe, the events were particularly suited to visual frames in terms of
both available video footage and photographs. Prior studies have examined the visual
coverage and framing of the September 11 attacks and the lead-up to the subsequent
invasion and war in Afghanistan. Contrary to common belief, photographs, and video
recordings are not neutral (Bissell, 2000). When it comes to visual framing, still and
recorded images have ideological functions that are “easy to conceal because they appear
to record rather than to transform or signify” (Woolacott, 1982, p. 99). Moreover, the
mere presence or absence of certain photographs represents a manifestation of visual
framing (Fahmy, 2004). This idea correlates with the concept of exclusionary framing
(Asim, 2012). Exclusionary frames omit relevant information, or what is not present.
Another important element to consider in visual framing is the frequency of visual
depictions (Fahmy, 2004). Entman (1993) described that concept by repeating and
reinforcing visual images that reference some ideas and not others, frames convey
thematically constant meanings, rendering ideas more salient and memorable than others.
The more frequently an image is shown or topic is mentioned by the news media, the
higher the level of importance placed by the public, along with the frame it is presented
in.
Fahmy’s study (2004) examined photographs of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks from both English and Arabic newspapers to categorize their visual frames in
terms of theme, topic, graphicness, dominance, and use of thematic reporting. Fahmy’s
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analysis indicated that while the news coverage of an English-language newspaper
emphasized the emotion of guilt in the September 11 attack by showing visual messages
that humanized the victims, it de-emphasized the bombing of Afghanistan by showing
images that focused less on the victims and more on aid, patriotism, arsenal, and
weaponry, thus framing the Afghan War in a technical frame. On a similar level, the
news coverage in an Arabic-language newspaper emphasized the emotion of guilt in the
Afghan War by showing photographs that humanized the victims. It de-emphasized the
September 11 attacks by showing visual messages that focused less on the victims and
more on material destruction and planes crashing into the buildings, thus also framing the
terrorist attack in a more technical frame (Fahmy, 2004).
In comparison to the previous U.S.-led war effort in the region, which was the
Gulf War in 1991, Perlmutter (1999) wrote that the management of news coverage of the
first Gulf War included not only censorship, but also the creation and distribution of
images and the creation of news frames to guide interpretation of published photographs.
Public sentiment at the time did not initially favor war. Many Americans wished to avoid
war so much that only hours before bombing began, a plurality of the public agreed with
a proposal to end the crisis by giving a piece of Kuwait to Iraq, if Kuwait would agree
(Allen, O’Loughlin, Jasperson, & Sullivan, 1994).
Nightly network news programs largely ignored public efforts to oppose President
George H. W. Bush’s military policies in the Persian Gulf. Of the 2,855 minutes of
television coverage of the crisis from August 8, 1990, until January 3, 1991, only 29
minutes or about 1% of the coverage showed popular opposition to the U.S. military
build-up in the Gulf (Allen, O’Loughlin, Jasperson, & Sullivan, 1994). However, within
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hours of the January 16, 1991, beginning of “Operation Desert Storm,” public debate
ceased and differences in opinion that had endured, despite media inattention, shifted
instantaneously to an apparent consensus in favor of U.S. military action (Allen,
O’Loughlin, Jasperson, & Sullivan, 1994).
This about-face by the public is in large part explained by framing. The news
media omitted coverage of the war protests, exclusionary framing, and instead followed
the U.S. military’s lead in portraying the Gulf War as a “bloodless affair” (Prince, 1993,
p. 236). To minimize the violence, the news media avoided the portrayal of body bags of
U.S. troops and Iraqi victims of air attacks (Shaw & Carr-Hill, 1992). Images of Iraqi
casualties did not appear in the news media (Schiller, 1992). Further, the news media
spent a lot of time depicting the use and efficiency of smart bombs (Perlmutter, 1998),
emphasizing technical aspects of the weaponry and material damage, such as bridges
blowing up, property damage and other forms of non-human destruction (Prince, 1993).
Afghanistan, Soviets, and the Americans
For many, the attacks on September 11 demanded a background explanation,
especially for a shocked nation that was simultaneously panicked, angry, and uncertain of
the future. Historical references in reporting provided the opportunity to give the why and
how of the story, or, in other words, its historical context (Winfield, Friedman, &
Trisnadi, 2002). Some of the most frequently cited references included the previous
World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, and the bombing of the guided missile destroyer USS Cole in 2000
(Winfield, Friedman, & Trisnadi, 2002).
However, the historical involvement of the United States in the Soviet-Afghan
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war was largely absent from the news coverage. Most studies indicate that this conflict
remains an enigma for much of the American public (Grau & Yahya, 1995). It was not
widely cited in American news coverage in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan (Edy & Meirick, 2007). Historical references that describe the communist
regime in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992 have continued to remain largely absent from
today’s news coverage, despite parallels with the current conflict. It was during that 14year period that the society and politics of Afghanistan were brutally transformed,
resulting in the chaos of the 1990s in which the Taliban came to power (Halliday &
Tanin, 1998). To fully understand the history of the U.S.-Afghan relationship that
preceded the terrorist attacks of September 11, one must first take into consideration the
Soviet-Afghan relationship.
The Soviets first became involved in Afghanistan with a small-scale invasion in
1925. The incursion stemmed from a land dispute over an island in the Oxus River.
Russia withdrew and recognized Afghan ownership because the island was not worth the
price of antagonizing both the Afghans and Great Britain, which had previously occupied
the country until 1919 (Hammond, 1984). Additional Soviet invasions occurred in 1929
and 1930 along with the rise and fall of several national leaders over the course of the
next 30 years. However, the loyalties of the people of Afghanistan remained largely
tribal, without widespread recognition of a centralized government.
During this 1960s, the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) was formed. Three leaders emerged in this party: Nur Mohammad Taraki,
Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal (Hammond, 1984). The PDPA split into two
factions: Khalq headed by Taraki, and Parcham headed by Karmal. The Khalq faction
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favored a Leninist-type party based on the working class, while Parcham wanted to form
a broad national-democratic front. Basically, the division was more personal than
political. In 1973, Parcham supported former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud in a
bloodless coup that ousted King Zahir and established a republican-style system of
government. In return, Daoud appointed several Parcham members to key positions.
Later on, however, Daoud wanted to reduce the influence of Parcham. In 1973, he
introduced a new constitution that only permitted one party to act legally, the National
Revolutionary party, and Daoud personally selected the members of its central committee
(Coleman, 2014).
Daoud also began to change Afghanistan’s foreign policy by pulling away from
the Soviet Union and strengthening relations with other countries, particularly Pakistan
and Iran. He began talks with President Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan to reduce conflict
over the Pashtunistan issue (Cogan, 2008). Known as the geographic region inhabited by
the indigenous Pashtun people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pashtunistan bordered
the Punjab to the east, Persian-speaking regions to the west and north, Kashmir to the
northeast, and the Balochistan region to the south. The shah of Iran also pledged financial
aid to Afghanistan, which would have provided for the construction of a railroad. This
new shift in policy encouraged the Afghan communists to plan a coup.
The communist Khalq and Parcham factions united under Taraki to carry out the
coup in 1978. With the help of the army, Daoud was killed, and Taraki assumed power.
Taraki instituted land and debt reforms without considering the cultural and religious
heritage of the Afghan people (Coleman, 2014). According to Hammond (1984), the
reforms were implemented too rapidly for the population to adjust. The Soviet policy of
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communist gradualism was not followed. Communism was also associated with atheism,
which was completely unacceptable to the Muslim Afghans. Taraki’s reforms ultimately
failed, and the Afghans rebelled (Coleman, 2014).
The Soviet Union blamed the failed reforms not on Taraki but on Amin. Taraki
had become a figurehead leader, while Amin had obtained much power in the
government. The Soviets wanted to oust Amin. However, Amin, fearing assassination,
acted first. He strengthened his position by dismissing Taraki’s supporters from key
cabinet positions and then had Taraki captured and killed. Nevertheless, Soviet and rebel
opposition to Amin was very strong, and in December 1979, the Soviet Union launched a
large-scale invasion of Afghanistan (Hammond, 1984).
When the Soviets invaded, Amin was killed for his ineptness and insubordination.
He was replaced with Babrak, who had become a loyal Soviet puppet. The Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan for several reasons. A primary one was the Brezhnev Doctrine,
which required intervention whenever a communist regime was threatened by counterrevolution. The Soviet Union’s determination to secure its frontiers by surrounding itself
with friendly, subservient, or neutral states was another factor (Ouimet, 2003).
The Soviets also feared Muslim fanaticism. The Afghan rebels had declared jihad,
holy war, against the Soviet Union. The Russians feared that if the Muslims in
Afghanistan succeeded in overthrowing communism and driving them out, then the
Muslims in Central Asia might try to do the same thing (Brandt, 2014). The Soviets
expected the invasion to lead to a suppression of the resistance movement of the rebels,
but the effect was just the opposite. The civil war between competing Afghan factions
was transformed into a national liberation struggle of all Afghans against the Soviet
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invaders. Soviet control of the central government in Kabul meant little in the province
areas of the rebels because Afghanistan had always operated according to the rule of local
autonomy. This meant that the Soviets would have to subdue every village and win over
or eliminate every local leader (Brandt, 2014). The same holds true today for the United
States, 14 years after the current war in Afghanistan began.
At the time, the reaction of President Jimmy Carter and his administration to the
Soviet invasion was one of surprise. Afghanistan was still viewed by many in the United
States as an insignificant country. Also, the crisis of U.S. hostages in Iran focused media
attention away from the invasion. Some verbal reprimands were issued by the
administration, but no military action was forthcoming. The United States implemented
economic sanctions against the Soviets and boycotted the 1980 Olympics to be held in
Moscow (Dimitrakis, 2012).
Rise of the Taliban
As the Cold War intensified during the 1980s, the United States took a veiled
interest in Afghanistan to make a play against the Soviets. U.S. policy at the time
supported Afghanistan with arms and supplies for no other reason than to make the war
more costly to the Soviets. The United States backed the Afghan rebels, also known as
mujahedeen, with both financial and military support in their war against the Soviets
(Hartman, 2002).
The Taliban was one of the mujahedeen factions that formed during the Soviet
occupation and eventually took control of the country following the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan in 1989. The majority of Taliban officials were of Pashtun heritage
(Cogan, 2008). They were born in Pakistani refugee camps and educated in Pakistani
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madrassas, or Islamic schools. The Taliban based their strict religious philosophy on the
teachings of the Deobandis, a branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam (Gunn, 2003). Taken to its
extreme, this became the primary religious and ideological influence on the Taliban
(Ingram, 2014).
Some of the Deobandis’ beliefs include a restrictive view of women’s rights,
opposition to forms of hierarchy in the Muslim community, and rejection of Shia Islam.
The Taliban also incorporated a strict interpretation of Sharia law combined with the
tribal codes of Pashtunwali. They also opposed most attempts at modernization (Ingram,
2014).
The Taliban first began their takeover of Afghanistan in 1994 with the city of
Kandahar. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar gained recognition by seeking
retribution for two teenage girls who had been raped by local warlords. He later emerged
as a Robin Hood figure, who helped the poor against disreputable commanders and
guerilla leaders (Rashid, 2001). His prestige grew because he asked no reward for his
efforts but only support for his movement. He promised to bring peace and restore pure
Islam to the war-ravaged people of Afghanistan.
The Taliban were aided with money and arms from Pakistan. As they continued
their takeover, the Taliban disarmed the local population. In 1995, the Taliban captured
the city of Herat, where the majority of the population adheres to Shia Islam. As the
Taliban continued its conquest, a counter-alliance, comprised of former mujahedeen
soldiers, built a resistance movement. Two of these leaders included Ahmad Shah
Massoud, a Tajik who fought for the city of Kabul, and General Rashid Dostum, an
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Uzbek who fought for the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Nevertheless, despite fierce battles,
these cities eventually fell to the Taliban. (“Afghanistan: Dostum’s Return,” 2009).
Once the Taliban assumed control in Afghanistan, harsh reforms were imposed on
the population. They removed women from public view. Afghan women were not
allowed to attend schools and were forced to wear burkas, all-enveloping, head-to-toe
veils. Men also had to grow their beards as long as their fists. All forms of entertainment,
such as music, television, and even kite flying, were banned (Rashid, 2001).
The Taliban attempted to rule with shared political leadership, but by 1996, it
became highly centralized, secretive, dictatorial, and inaccessible. Two main Islamic
councils, shuras, were established in Kabul and Kandahar. The Kabul Shura attended to
the day-to-day running of the government and the city. However, the Kandahar Shura
ultimately had the decision-making power. Mullah Mohammed Omar consulted the
shuras less and less and eventually fell into the role of dictator (Coleman, 2014).
On October 15, 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution
1267, establishing the al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, which linked the two
groups as terrorist entities and imposed sanctions on their funding, travel, and arms
shipments (Genser & Barth, 2010). This move by the United Nations followed a period of
growing power for al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, who guided the terror
group from Afghanistan and Peshawar, Pakistan, in the late 1980s, to Sudan in 1991, and
back to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The Taliban provided al-Qaeda sanctuary for
operations (Genser & Barth, 2010).
The Afghan drug trade was a problem that the Taliban could literally not afford to
solve. Islamic teachings strictly forbid the consumption or production of such drugs, but
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the Taliban justified its opium trade because unbelievers of the West consumed the drug.
Many Afghan farmers grew the poppies used in the production of opium as their main
cash crop and source of income. If the Taliban banned opium production, it would risk
angering the farmers and losing state revenue. Instead, the Taliban imposed an Islamic
tax, zakat, on all dealers moving opium (Rashid, 2001).
The Taliban experienced an opportunity to gain a legitimate revenue source when
an Argentina-based oil company, Bridas Corporation, approached them. Bridas had
previously signed a contract with Turkmenistan to build pipelines within the country and
extract oil and gas. The Turkmenistan government rescinded the contract after the
discovery of a large gas deposit. Bridas then courted the Taliban in hopes of securing a
pipeline (Brown, 2013).
As the same time, U.S. interests were piqued in cashing in on the natural
resources of the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union. A U.S. oil
company, Unocal Corporation, also began negotiations with the Taliban to build a
pipeline through Afghanistan. Unocal, however, refused to finalize negotiations because
the Taliban government did not have international recognition (Rashid, 2001). Also, the
Taliban outraged feminist organizations in the United States with its treatment of women.
This pressure forced President Bill Clinton’s administration and other investors to end
negotiations. Pakistan nurtured the Taliban into dominance in Afghanistan. In fact,
Pakistan’s original intention was to use Afghanistan for Kashmiri training camps.
However, Pakistan did not have a firm influence once the Taliban was in power. Pakistan
suffered economically in the black market trade that used Afghanistan in its transport
(Smith, 2014).
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The U.S. Response
At the same time during the 1990s, the greater the U.S. involvement in a
globalizing world became, the less knowledgeable or concerned Americans became about
events beyond their own borders (Talbott & Chanda, 2001). Much of the media turned
inward, focusing on domestic issues, closing overseas bureaus, and replacing foreign
news coverage with personal lifestyle features. The media as a whole failed to report
when U.S foreign policymakers set deadlines but did not enforce them, made threats but
never carried them out, or blamed others for American failures (Talbott & Chanda, 2001).
This perceived decline in the quality and attention span of press coverage found a parallel
in American diplomacy. According to Talbott and Chanda (2001), throughout the 1990s,
sloppy negotiations were aimed at getting an agreement, almost any agreement, and
working out the details later. That would change on September 11, 2001.
Just days before September 11, 2001, on September 9, Ahmad Shah Massoud,
commander of the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban coalition, was assassinated by alQaeda operatives. The killing of Massoud, a master of guerilla warfare known as the
“Lion of the Panjshir” (Lamothe, 2004, p.74), dealt a serious blow to the anti-Taliban
resistance. Terrorism experts believed his assassination assured Osama bin Laden
protection by the Taliban after the September 11 terrorist attacks (Lamothe, 2004).
On September 18, President George W. Bush signed into law a joint resolution
authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking the United States on
September 11. Then on October 7, less than one month after the terrorist attacks,
President Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan to flush out the Taliban-led
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government, which supported the al-Qaeda terrorist network and the al-Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden himself (Izard & Perkins, 2011)
In light of the September 11 attacks, the history of U.S. involvement in
Afghanistan is invaluable in understanding the rise of extreme fundamentalism in Islam
and why Afghanistan provided a suitable breeding ground for such a movement. Over the
course of its history, Afghanistan has had the misfortune of being both a weakened state
with much domestic civil unrest, as well as a pawn of foreign governments. The rise of
the Taliban is partially the result of abandonment and neglect by the world community
(Steele, 2010).
September 11, Framing, and Broadcast Journalism
In examining studies on the media reporting of Afghanistan following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, framing has been used as a tool to analyze the coverage. This
includes special emphasis on what has not been reported in the news, by introducing the
concept of exclusionary framing. This additional definition adds to the understanding of
how frames can be influential, not only through deliberate methods of creation, but also
through the phenomenon of omission (Asim, 2012).
Entman specifically addressed the function of media frames used in relation to the
events of September 11, 2001. According to Entman (2004), when applying the functions
of framing, the problematic “effect” resulted in thousands of civilian deaths from an act
of war against the United States. The “cause” was found to be the Taliban government of
Afghanistan and the al-Qaeda terrorist network, as well as its leaders, Mullah Mohammed
Omar and Osama bin Laden (Fitzgerald & Gould, 2009). The U.S. government’s “moral
judgment” was condemnation of these agents, which were often referred to as “evil” by
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White House officials. And the initial remedy was the war against Afghanistan. All four
of these framing functions hold together in a kind of cultural logic, according to Entman
(2003), each helping to sustain the others. Emphasis should be given to the problematic
definition and the remedy because they promote support for or opposition to a public
policy (Entman, 2004).
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks were the “biggest story to ever occur on
the morning TV shift” (Stelter, 2013, p.27). Historically, much network broadcast
programming was created mostly for women with the goal of consistently informing and
entertaining viewers. Network news shows thrive in what is known as the “familiarity
industry” because “familiarity breeds security” (Stelter, 2013, p.28). And in network
television, the watchword is consistency.
However, on the morning of September 11, the role of broadcast news media
quickly transitioned from the regular morning show line-up to crisis mode, informing a
shocked country about one of the most tragic events in the nation’s history. Reporting on
the morning of September 11 has been ranked among journalism’s finest hours (Izard &
Perkins, 2011). But what made September 11 different? What was the role of America’s
three major television networks?
For the media, September 11 was different. First, many in broadcast television
dropped the pretense of being “Olympian gods on high” (Izard & Perkins, 2011, p.2).
They became human and showed emotion on air. Second, September 11 marked the
return of advocacy reporting. There were not two sides to this breaking story when U.S.
civilians were attacked. Third, the inventiveness of the reporting made September 11
different because news media had little direct access to public officials as events
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unfolded. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the media served as a consoling
mechanism during the crisis (Izard & Perkins, 2011).
Television is undoubtedly a personality-driven medium (Izard & Perkins, 2011).
There is an emotional bonding between audience and reporter. On September 11, grief
was the primary emotion that was shared with the nation (Izard & Perkins, 2011). Other
emotions included shock and anger. Emotion, especially when displayed on television,
can be perceived to conflict with the American media’s traditional mantra of objectivity
in seeking the truth. The three television networks played critical roles in reassuring the
country during a disaster by maintaining control and consistency while on air. As the
crisis unfolded, their function was to provide “clear, precise, accurate, and timely
information to thousands of people who made decisions about their own safety” (Izard &
Perkins, 2011, p.8).
Research has shown the power of television to provoke emotion (Nimmo &
Combs, 1985). Television is a ubiquitous and highly stimulating visual medium (Izard &
Perkins, 2011). When they watch television, viewers experience time and space with
reporters on screen (Izard & Perkins, 2011). Facial gestures and body language all
convey the message. On television, expressions usually dominate words. Television was
ranked as America’s main source of information on September 11. Viewers watched an
average of eight hours of television on September 11, with 18% of Americans viewing
upwards of 13 hours that day (Robertson, 2001).
At first, many networks and reporters treated the initial news of an airliner
crashing into the World Trade Center as an accident. But after the second crash, most
journalists correctly concluded this was an act of terrorism. All major television networks
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aired live pictures from the scene within 15 min. after American Airlines Flight 11
slammed into the North Tower at 9:45 a.m. (Talbott & Chanda, 2001). As the crisis
unfolded, reporters were open and honest about what they did not know, telling viewers
whether information was confirmed, and correcting wrong information as soon as
possible. Transparency was key (Izard & Perkins, 2011).
According to sociologist Arthur G. Neal, “An extraordinary event becomes a
national trauma under circumstances in which the social system is disrupted to such a
magnitude that it commands the attention of all major subgroups of the population … The
major task, individually and collectively, is that of integrating the traumatic event into the
fabric of social life in order to make it less threatening” (Neal, 1998, pp.9-12). During
such a crisis, television provides not only facts and meanings but offers its own kind of
therapy for viewers. The immediate coverage of September 11 was characterized by
chaos, uncertainty, and abnormality. The role of media was then to normalize the
abnormal (Izard & Perkins, 2011).
Academic research shows that when the social order is seriously disrupted, people
usually desire more information than the media can provide (Neal, 1998). During a crisis,
the public becomes dependent on the media for news that may be vital for survival and
for important messages from authorities. They look to the media for information,
explanations, and interpretations (Graber, 1980). In 1980, the National Research Council
Committee on Disasters and the Mass Media found that the functions of television news
go through distinct stages during a crisis. The council suggested that the press had the
following functions during a crisis: warning of predicted or impending disasters;
conveying the information to officials, relief agencies, and the public; charting the
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progress of relief and recovery; dramatizing lessons learned for the purpose of future
preparedness; taking part in long-term public education programs; and defining slowonset problems as crises or disasters (National Research Council Committee on Disasters
in the Mass Media, 1979).
With this theoretical framework and research in mind, this thesis has employed
the use of content analysis to examine the evening broadcast news coverage from the
three major American television networks: ABC, NBC, and CBS. The researcher has
coded, analyzed, and organized broadcast media coverage from these three networks,
starting on September 11, 2001, and ending with the beginning of the war in Afghanistan
on October 7, 2001. To the researcher’s knowledge, these evening shows’ broadcast
coverage in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, have not previously been
directly compared or examined in the context of media framing. The big three networks
also carried the terrorist attacks live for millions of viewers on September 11, 2001,
staying on air commercial-free for hours that day. They played an instrumental role in
informing the public and framing the story in those first few critical hours during and
after the attacks.
The research questions for this thesis include the following:
RQ1

Will the most frequently cited historical reference be the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing?

RQ2

Will the news frames of conflict and responsibility be the most frequently
used, and human interest and economic consequences frames the least
used?
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RQ3

Will the historical references regarding the U.S.-Afghan relationship be
most likely seen in conflict frames, responsibility frames, or morality
frames?

RQ4

Will the inclusion of quotes or attributed statements from White House
and/or Cabinet-level officials be most likely pro-war or anti-war?
Definitions are contained the in the codebook (Appendix A).
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Chapter 3: Methodology
For the content analysis, this research employed the use of the holdings available
at the Vanderbilt University Television News Archive. Content analysis is a method used
to quantitatively analyze communication messages, such as texts, visuals, and sounds.
This method then uses numbers to describe the communication messages. One of the
major advantages of content analysis is the ability to summarize large bodies of
communication messages, such as the hours of broadcast news coverage that is proposed
for review in this study. Another advantage is that content analysis is an unobtrusive
technique that does not require interaction with human subjects or any approval from an
institutional review board. Content analysis also enables people to study historical
moments and differences over time (Krippendorff, 2004).
According to Krippendorff (2004), six questions must be addressed in every
content analysis. These include: Which data are analyzed? How are they defined? What is
the population from which they are drawn? What is the context relative to which the data
are analyzed? What are the boundaries of the analysis? What is the target of the
inferences? These questions are addressed below in the steps that are outlined to conduct
this particular content analysis of broadcast media.
Determining Data Sets
The sampling unit taken from the possible population of broadcasts available for
review include the evening news broadcasts of ABC, NBC, and CBS, starting on the
morning of September 11, 2001, and ending with the beginning of the war in Afghanistan
on October 7, 2001. The coding unit, or communication message selected to be
categorized individually for this content analysis, is any segment in those broadcasts that
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references the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or the U.S. invasion of
Afghanistan. Keywords used included “terrorist attack,” “Afghanistan,” and “Osama Bin
Laden.” The researcher used the Vanderbilt University’s Television News Archive to
access the broadcasts and perform keyword searches to narrow down the desired
segments. Once the coding units have been identified, then the segment was coded in
terms of historical reference and media framing. The researcher trained one additional
coder before participating in this research project. A total of 90 broadcasts were coded.
Coding and Existing Media Frames
For the first part of the content analysis, the researcher examined the network
news coverage to determine the number of historical references that was provided on the
U.S.-Afghan relationship, as well as to determine what framing category best classifies
the news coverage. Historical references to code for each broadcast include U.S. support
for the Afghan mujahedeen, or freedom fighters, during the 1980s Afghan-Soviet
conflict; the previous World Trade Center bombing in 1993; the 1998 bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the bombing of the guided missile destroyer USS
Cole in 2000; any other historical reference that is related to Afghanistan; or any other
historical reference that is non-Afghan-related.
Next, the researcher made use of existing media frames, including conflict, human
interest, attribution of responsibility, morality, and economic consequences (Valkenburg
& Semetko 2000). The researcher coded each broadcast segment according to these
frame definitions.
Once a broadcast has been coded into one of the five categories with the historical
reference also coded, the researcher then documented whether a White House or Cabinet-
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level official or spokesperson was quoted or had a statement attributed to him or her
during the broadcast concerning the terrorist attacks of September 11 and/or the
American invasion of Afghanistan. This quote or attributed statement was coded as either
pro-war or anti-war. Next, the researcher coded at what point the segment concerning
Afghanistan and the events of September 11, 2001, was featured in the evening broadcast
news program. Categories here are the first half of the 30-minute evening news segment
or the second half of the 30-minute evening news segment, demonstrating the topic’s
level of importance according to when it is featured. The completed codebook is
available in Appendix A.
Timeline and Cost
The timeline for this research study’s content analysis was September 11, 2001
through October 7, 2001. The researcher had a budget of $875 to cover travel expenses
for both the researcher and coder, relating to assisting with the content analysis. Travel
expenses included mileage and parking costs. To conserve funds, the researcher and
coder visited the Vanderbilt University’s Television News Archive over a period of three
months to access the network broadcasts and perform keyword searches to narrow in on
the desired segments. The archive charges $10 per hour to access the videos onsite,
versus a charge of $50 per video segment to make DVD copies of the evening news
programs. The researcher worked with one coder to assist in reviewing and examining
every official evening news broadcast from ABC, NBC, and CBS, starting on September
11, 2001, and ending with the beginning of the war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001.
That is roughly 45 hr. worth of broadcasts in total over a five-week period, with each
news segment running 30 min. each.
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For the purposes of this content analysis, the holdings from Vanderbilt
University’s Television News Archives were used. This online news archive is one of the
world’s most extensive and complete archives of television news. The core collection
includes evening news broadcasts from ABC, CBS, and NBC since 1968. An initial
online search of these available holdings yielded 9,065 results, using the keywords
“terrorist attack,” “Afghanistan,” and “Osama Bin Laden.” These results were further
narrowed down using the date parameters of September 11, 2001, through October 7,
2001, as well as limiting the search results to only the three major American networks of
ABC, NBC, and CBS. Other search criteria excluded results from commercials, program
introductions, and anchor “Good Night” segments, which are the anchor sign offs of the
news programs. This yielded 105 results that matched the search criteria. Of those 105
results, three were not available for viewing; nine did not work; and three were
mislabeled. This left 90 viable broadcast segments for coding.
Validity and Reliability
To address the issues of validity and reliability of this content analysis, the
researcher used one independent coder to help code the broadcast segments. An
intercoder reliability test was conducted to measure the extent to which the researcher
and coder, working independently, code the same message and reach the same
conclusions. The test required that they review the same 10 broadcasts and perform the
content analysis, using the codebook and coding form. The percentage of agreement
among the coders was reviewed. At minimum, the coders should agree 80% of the time
(Krippendorff, 2004). If the agreement is below 80%, the researcher will determine what
the problem was, and if necessary, the codebook will be modified, and the coder will be
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retrained.
For this content analysis, intercoder reliability was calculated at 88.9% agreement
on the first two variables for type of historical reference made and type of media frame
used. For the remaining third, fourth, and fifth variables of comment made, pro-war or
anti-war comment, and placement in news segment, intercoder reliability was calculated
at 100%. Table 1 below details the sample used for testing intercoder reliability.

Table 1
Intercoder Reliability Test
Percent
Agreement
Variable
1
Variable
2
Variable
3
Variable
4
Variable
5

Scott’s Cohen’
Pi
s
Kappa

88.90% 0.617

0.625

Krippend
-orff’s
Alpha
(nominal)
0.638

N
N
Agree Disagree
-ment -ment

N
Cases

N
Decisions

8

1

9

18

88.90% -0.059

0

0

8

1

9

18

100%

1

1

1

9

0

9

18

100%

1

1

1

9

0

9

18

100%

1

1

1

9

0

9

18

After the coding was finished and compiled, the researcher then compared the
results of the content analysis of the broadcast news coverage with archived, online data
from the Pew Research Center for People and the Press’s public opinion polls conducted
during the same timeframe as the broadcasts, as well as statements from White House
and Cabinet-level officials, to see if the amount, or lack thereof, of historical context

	
  32	
  
	
  

	
  
presented in the news coverage, as well as the frame it was placed in, coincided with U.S.
policy towards Afghanistan. The researcher and coder used a coding sheet to record
information from the relevant broadcasts.
For the purposes of this thesis, after the coding was finished, the researcher
compared the content analysis of the network news coverage with online data from the
Pew Research Center for People and the Press’s public opinion polls conducted during
the same time frame in 2001, as well as statements from White House and Cabinet-level
officials made on ABC, NBC, and CBS, to see if the amount, or lack thereof, of historical
context presented in the broadcast news coverage had any correlation with public policy.
The argument holds that if the American public had been aware of the maximum
information, including the full historical context regarding the U.S.-Afghan relationship,
as well as the extent of anti-American sentiment in the region, public opinion may have
altered the course of American policies toward Afghanistan before the war began,
possibly shortening the duration of the current conflict (Asim, 2012).
For RQ1, coding was performed as to the historical references that were made
during the broadcasts. The researcher made note when any of the following references
were made, or not: no historical reference made; U.S. support for the Afghan mujahedeen
(freedom fighters) during the 1980s Afghan-Soviet conflict; previous World Trade Center
bombing in 1993; 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania;
bombing of the guided missile destroyer USS Cole in 2000; other historical reference
(Afghan-related); other historical reference (non-Afghan-related); and if more than one
historical reference made.
For RQ2, coding was performed as to the type of media frame that was used
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during the broadcasts. The research recorded when any of the following media frames
were applied or not: none of these frames was used; conflict frame; human interest frame;
attribution of responsibility frame; morality frame; economic consequences frame; and if
more than one of these frames was employed.
For RQ3, comparisons were made between the recorded historical references
regarding the U.S.-Afghan relationship and the conflict, responsibility, and morality
frames to determine which combination occurred most frequently among the broadcasts.
For RQ4, the researcher documented if a quote from a White House and/or Cabinet-level
official was featured during the broadcast. If it was, the researcher then coded the quote
as either pro-war or anti-war.

	
  34	
  
	
  

	
  
Chapter 4: Research Findings from Content Analysis
In regards to RQ1 “Will the most frequently cited historical reference be the 1993
World Trade Center bombing?,” the findings of the content analysis showed that no
historical references were made to the previous World Trade Center bombing in 1993.
The most common result was that no historical reference was made during the broadcast.
Of the broadcast segments (N = 90) that were coded, the most common result at
68.89% (n = 62) was that no historical reference was made during the news program. The
second most common result was other Afghan-related historical reference, with 25.56%
(n = 23). Other historical references made during the broadcasts include U.S. support for
the Afghan mujahedeen during the 1980s Afghan-Soviet conflict at 3.33% (n = 3), the
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania at 3.33% (n = 3), and other
non-Afghan related historical reference at 1.11 (n = 1). Those historical references not
used at all in any of the broadcasts were the previous World Trade Center bombing in
1993 and the bombing of the guided missile destroyer USS Cole in 2000. Table 2 below
summarizes the historical references that were coded for each network’s coverage. For
ABC, there were a total of 29 segments that were coded; for NBC, there were 29; and for
CBS, there were 32.
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to compare the use
and/or type of historical references among the evening news programs broadcast between
September 11, 2001 through October 7, 2001. There was not a significant difference
between networks on the use of or types of historical references, [F(2, 87) = .407, p =
0.667]. The F statistic for differences among networks was 2, and the F statistic for the
differences among the historical references was 87.
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Table 2
Type of Historical Reference & Network Coverage
Type of
Historical
Reference
No historical
reference
U.S. support for
the Afghan
mujahedeen
(freedom
fighters) during
the 1980s
Afghan-Soviet
conflict
Previous World
Trade Center
bombing in 1993
1998 bombings
of the U.S.
embassies in
Kenya and
Tanzania
Bombing of the
guided missile
destroyer USS
Cole in 2000
Other historical
reference
(Afghan-related)
Other historical
reference
(Afghan-related)
Other historical
reference (nonAfghan-related)
More than one
historical
reference made

ABC
Percent

n

NBC
Percent

n

CBS
Percent

n

59

17

76

22

72

23

7

2

0

0

3

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

2

0

0

3

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

28

8

24

7

25

8

0

0

3

1

0

0

3

1

0

3
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When examining the media frames employed during the broadcast programs, Patti
M. Valkenburg’s and Holli A. Semetko’s (2000) five news frames—conflict, human
interest, attribution of responsibility, morality, and economic consequences—were found.
The media frame of conflict was the most frequently employed across all networks with
84.44% (n = 76). The second most commonly used media frame was attribution of
responsibility with 24.44% (n = 22), followed by the frame of human interest with
18.89% (n = 17). The least used media frames included the economic consequences
frame at 10% (n = 9) and the morality frame at 6.67% (n = 6). Forty-four broadcasts
employed more than one media frame. The most frequent combination included the
conflict and attribution of responsibility frames at 45.46% (n = 41). Table 3 below
summarizes the types of media frames that were coded for each network’s coverage.
Once again, for ABC, there were a total of 29 segments that were coded; for NBC, there
were 29; and for CBS, there were 32.
In regard to RQ2 “Will the news frames of conflict and responsibility be the most
frequently used, and human interest and economic consequences frames the least used?,”
the findings of the content analysis showed that conflict and attribution of responsibility
were most frequently used. The least used frames were those of economic consequences
and morality.
An ANOVA test was conducted to compare the use and/or type of media frames
among the evening news programs broadcast between September 11, 2001 through
October 7, 2001. There was not a significant difference between networks on the use of
or types of historical references, [F(2, 138) = .243, p = 0.784]. The F statistic for
differences among networks was 2, and the F statistic for the differences among the
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media frames was 138. It should be noted that 49% (n = 44) of evening news programs
used more than one media frame per broadcast.
With respect to RQ3, “Will the historical references regarding the U.S.-Afghan
relationship be most likely seen in conflict frames, responsibility frames, or morality
frames?,” the findings from the content analysis showed that these historical references
were most often seen in the conflict frames.
An ANOVA test was conducted to compare how historical references regarding
the U.S.-Afghan relationship were used in conjunction with conflict frames,
responsibility frames, and morality frames. There was not a significant difference
between these historical references and these frames being used in conjunction with each
other, [F(1, 32) = .951, p = 0.337]. The F statistic for differences among historical
references regarding the U.S.-Afghan relationship was 2, and the F statistic for the
differences among the three media frames was 32.

Table 3
Type of Media Frame & Network Coverage
ABC

NBC

CBS

Type of
Media
Frame

Percent n

Percent n

Percent

n

None of
these frames
was used

3

1

0

0

3

1

Conflict

72

21

86

25

94

30

Human
interest

28

25

34

10

19

6
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Type of
Media
Frame

ABC

NBC

CBS

Percent n

Percent n

Percent

n

Attribution
14
of
responsibility

4

21

6

36

12

Morality

10

3

7

2

6

2

Economic
10
consequences

3

3

1

13

4

More than
one of these
frames was
used

11

45

13

63

20

38

A majority of all broadcasts, at 51.11% (n = 46), featured a direct quote from a
White House or Cabinet member made by the officials themselves during an on-camera
speech or interview. The most frequent on-camera officials were President George W.
Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Altogether, those comments made by
White House and Cabinet officials were predominantly pro-war at 69.57% (n = 63),
demonstrating support for the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan because the Taliban gave safe
harbor to Al Qaeda’s leader Osama Bin Laden.
In regard to RQ4, “Will the inclusion of quotes or attributed statements from
White House and/or Cabinet-level officials be most likely pro-war or anti-war?,” the
findings showed that the quotes and attributed statements were predominantly pro-war.
For example, during the NBC Nightly News broadcast on September 15, 2001, President
Bush said,
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They will try to hide, they will try to avoid the United States and our allies, but
we’re not going to let them. They run to the hills; they find holes to get in. And
we will do whatever it takes to smoke them out and get them running, and we’ll
get them. Listen, this is a great nation; we’re a kind people. None of us could have
envisioned the barbaric acts of these terrorists. But they have stirred up the might
of the American people, and we’re going to get them, no matter what it takes.
Another example, during the NBC Nightly News broadcast on September 28,
2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said,
I don’t know that I was trying to really be subtle or warn the American people
about anything other than the truth, and the truth is that this is a broad, sustained
multifaceted effort that is notably distinctively different from prior efforts. It is by
its very nature something that cannot be dealt with by some sort of massive attack
or invasion. It is a much more subtle, nuanced, difficult, shadowy set of problems
… I think the answer is yes. Enduring suggests that this is not a quick fix. It’s not
something that all of us who like to have things immediately over. It isn’t that
way. It is not going to be over in 5 min. or 5 months. It’ll take years, I suspect.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, news linked to the
attacks dominated network nightly news with 75.56% (n = 68) of stories placed within
the first 15 min. of the broadcast. Most often these segments covered U.S. and Pakistani
negotiations with the Taliban to turn over Osama Bin Laden and U.S. military
preparations for war.
Examining U.S. public opinion during the same time period of September 11,
2001, to October 7, 2001, data from the Pew Research Center for People and the Press
was used. This data was collected from telephone interviews conducted under the
direction of the Princeton Survey Research Associates among a nationwide sample of
1,488 adults. According to findings from Pew’s nationwide survey conducted September
21 through September 25, 2001, 44% of Americans (n = 655) think that taking military
action abroad to destroy global terrorist networks is more important than building up
defenses at home to prevent future attacks (Pew Research Center for People and the
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Press, 2001). From that same survey, nearly eight in 10 Americans think that punishing
terrorists is an important reason for using military force (Pew Research Center for People
and the Press, 2001).
When probing for the public’s degree of confidence in U.S. success in destroying
terrorist networks around the world, only 39% (n = 580) of Americans were very
confident that this could be achieved, while nearly as many, at 37% (n = 551), were only
somewhat confident (Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 2001). It should also
be noted that public uncertainty was also found over the timing of military action. Nearly
half the public at 49% (n = 729) was concerned that the Bush administration would delay
taking military action, while 34% (n = 506) worried that the administration would move
too quickly. Overall, polls showed solid support for military action, including the use of
ground troops, to retaliate against whoever was responsible for the terrorist attacks (Pew
Research Center for People and the Press, 2001).
In considering why the United States should go to war, Americans felt, by a
margin of 57% (n = 848) to 22% (n = 327), that the most important reason to take
military action against the terrorists was to prevent them from mounting future attacks
against the U.S., not to punish them for the actions already committed. However, most
Americans felt that both of these goals were very important. Nearly nine in ten said that
preventing future attacks gains the U.S. is a very important objective for military action,
and 79% (n = 1,176) felt that retribution is a very important objective.
A later Pew survey conducted just days before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
from October 1 through October 4, 2001, demonstrated the public’s reliance on news
media during that first month following the terrorist attacks. This data was collected from
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telephone interviews conducted under the direction of the Princeton Survey Research
Associates among a nationwide sample of 1,001 adults. Heavy media use was
widespread, with 73% (n = 731) of Americans paying close attention to the news about
the attacks. A majority at 67% (n = 671) kept radios and televisions tuned to news about
the attacks (Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 2001, October 4).
The public continued to rate the news media highly for its coverage. Most liked
the amount of coverage they saw, with 85% (n = 851) rating the coverage as excellent or
good. As seen in Table 4 below, news of how the attacks were carried out attracted the
most news interest, but most aspects of the story engaged majorities of the public, except
for news of the refugee crisis in Afghanistan (Pew Research Center for People and the
Press, 2001, October 4). Table 4 below outlines the top elements featured in news
coverage during the first month following the attacks.

Table 4
Top News Draw: How It Happened
Following Very
Closely
Elements of the Story…

Percent

Following
Fairly Closely
n

Percent

n

Finding out who did it and why 72

721

21

210

Building future U.S. defense

57

571

30

300

Building anti-terrorist coalition 53

531

31

310
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Following Very
Closely

Following
Fairly Closely

Elements of the Story …

Percent

n

Percent

n

Economic & financial effects

52

521

31

310

Possible U.S. military action

52

521

30

300

Refugee crisis in Afghanistan

31

310

36

360

Source: Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 2001, October 4.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
When examining the results from the content analysis, it is clear that the three
historic networks of ABC, NBC, and CBS and their evening programs played an
important and critical role in reassuring their audiences during and after the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, by keeping them informed with the latest information.
They also established a narrative in the lead-up to the invasion. This is demonstrated by
the heavy use of the conflict media frame, followed by the attribution of responsibility
frame.
In the early days following September 11, 2001, many evening network programs
tagged their broadcasts, setting the tone for stories that were reported. ABC used
“America Fights Back”; NBC used first “Attack on America” and later “America on
Alert”; and CBS used “America Rising,” “America Fights Back,” “Terror Trail,” and
finally “America Strikes Back.” Lending credibility to the coverage, all three networks
routinely used their veteran anchors to report on the news concerning the terrorist attacks.
ABC used Peter Jennings; NBC used Tom Brokaw; and CBS used Dan Rather.
Framing the narrative of coverage following the attacks of September 11, these
network evening news programs provided a steady drumbeat on the path to war in
Afghanistan, consoling the public in a time of national tragedy while also reassuring them
that the U.S. government would not let these acts of terrorism go unanswered. Within
days on September 15, the networks identified Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden as the
masterminds behind the attacks. From then until the October 7 invasion of Afghanistan,
these evening network programs employed both the conflict and attribution of
responsibility frames to shape their coverage. Coverage of the U.S. military build-up in

	
  44	
  
	
  

	
  
the region also focused on advanced weaponry and new technology that would be used,
much like the coverage of the Gulf War in 1991. In comparison to that war, with the
horrific September 11 attack on the homeland, little coverage was given to public protests
to the use of force in the lead up to war.
The only contrasts to the drumbeat of war were sparse human-interest features on
the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan as civilians sought to flee the region
before the U.S. attacked. For example, on NBC Nightly News broadcast on September 29,
2001, anchor John Seigenthaler discussed that the region had the world’s largest refugee
population, due in large part to the Soviet war of the 1980s and the Afghan civil war of
the 1990s. However, no mention was made of America’s role in those conflicts. In fact,
many Afghans interviewed in the refugee camps had no knowledge of the terrorist attacks
on September 11 due to the stark poverty they lived in and lack of technology.
A further presentation of the attribution of responsibility frame was used in
coverage of the Taliban as those providing safe harbor to bin Laden. The U.S.
government worked diligently to negotiate the surrender of bin Laden or else Afghanistan
would suffer the consequences. Many of the country’s people became refugees, fleeing
Afghanistan as the U.S. prepared for war. Some of the networks included coverage of the
humanitarian crisis in the region as the Afghans fled. However, as noted from the study,
few to no historical references were made regarding the rise of the Taliban or the U.S.
involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war.
Previous Research Studies
As noted in the previous literature review, other scholars have examined the role
of media framing in regards to Afghanistan and the terrorist attacks of September 11,
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2001. Asim (2012) looked at the role of exclusionary framing and media discourse as it
pertains to the American news media’s portrayal of Afghanistan. Asim (2012) analyzed a
large amount of data from television news coverage from the time of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan until the September 11, 2001 attacks. She used qualitative research and
grounded theory approach. Her analysis provided support that suggested that the
president and other government officials have the power to shape news coverage of war
and to manage public opinion (Asim, 2012).
The research presented here in this thesis dovetails Asim’s work by also
demonstrating the connected nature of administration rhetoric and media framing when it
comes to the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. This was seen in the pro-war
statements made by President Bush and other Cabinet-level officials leading up to the
invasion. Furthermore, the research presented in this thesis also employ’s Asim’s concept
of exclusionary framing as relevant to the examination of what is omitted in media
coverage with a focus on historical references. Historical references could have provided
context and a more in-depth understanding of why America was attacked on September
11, 2001.
For example, building on Asim’s research that the president has the power to
shape news coverage of war, President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress and
the nation in late September 2001 pushed forth the narrative that U.S. was attacked
because the terrorists hate Americans’ freedom. Bush stated,
Tonight, we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our
grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies
to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done … On September
the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.
Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on
foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties
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of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have
known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was
brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where
freedom itself is under attack …
“Americans are asking ‘Why do they hate us?’ They hate what they see right here
in this chamber: a democratically elected government. Their leaders are selfappointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of
speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.
However, this hatred because of freedom was simply not the case. U.S. policy in
the region was (Regan, 2004). In reality, the Al Qaeda terrorists had been very explicit in
their reasoning for attacking America, including the fact that U.S. troops were stationed
in Saudi Arabia, Islam’s holy land, during and after the Gulf War, as well as the U.S.’s
unquestioned support of Israel. Al Qaeda, formed in 1988 after Bin Laden had helped the
Afghans push the Soviets out of Afghanistan, was meant to help repeal foreign influence
in the Middle East. The United States became their prime target with the organization
declaring jihad, or holy war, against U.S. soldiers in 1996, and later all Americans in
1998 (Regan, 2004). As seen in the results of the research for this thesis, historical
references were largely not used by the three major network evening news programs.
These references could have provided valuable context and insight to the American
people as the country went to war.
A second research study cited in the literature review was Fahmy’s 2004 work on
examining the visual framing of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Fahmy
recorded the types of photographs used in English and Arabic newspapers. He found that
both sets of newspapers conformed to the journalistic standards of newsworthiness when
it came to the selection and use of photographs. Analysis also indicated while the news
coverage of an English newspaper emphasized guilt in the September 11 attacks by
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showing visual messages that humanized the victims, it de-emphasized the bombing of
Afghanistan by showing images that focused least on the victims and more on aid,
patriotism, arsenal, and weaponry, thus framing the Afghan war in a technical frame
(Fahmy, 2004). On a similar level, the news coverage of an Arabic newspaper
emphasized guilt in the Afghan war by showing photographs that humanized the victims.
It de-emphasized the September 11 attacks by showing visual messages that focused least
on the victims and more on material destruction and planes crashing into the buildings,
thus also framing the terrorist attacks in a more technical frame (Fahmy, 2004).
This thesis also echoed Fahmy’s findings with results showing that most network
evening news coverage used the conflict frame and attribution of responsibility frame.
Reporting by ABC, NBC, and CBS also emphasized U.S. preparation for war, paying
special attention to new weapons technologies and America’s pursuit of bringing the
terrorists to justice versus the devastating humanitarian impact the invasion would have
on Afghan civilians.
Limitations and Areas for Future Study
The researcher for this thesis recognizes some limitations of study. One of these
limitations includes the scope of material that was examined. Only evening news
programs from ABC, NBC, and CBS were analyzed. The material examined also only
included those broadcasts from September 11, 2001 through October 7, 2001.
Additionally, not all broadcasts between those dates were available for viewing. Three
were not available; nine did not work; and three were mislabeled. Another limitation of
this study is the keywords that were used in the search of the Vanderbilt Television News
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Archive. Those keywords were “terrorist attack,” “Afghanistan,” and “Osama Bin
Laden.”
Areas for future study on the topics of media framing, Afghanistan, and the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 could include expanding the date parameters of
the current research to include evening news coverage beyond the start of the war on
October 7, 2001. An interesting study would be to examine the shift in coverage from
Afghanistan on September 11, 2001 through March 19, 2003, which marked the
beginning of the U.S. war in Iraq. Another future area of study could include a
comparison of the three big networks’ morning and evening news programs, given that
the morning programs carried the terrorist attacks live. And finally, another area to build
on would be comparing network television coverage of September 11, 2001 and
Afghanistan to cable news coverage, including CNN and Fox News.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the research presented here showed that a lack of historical
references combined with the dominant use of the conflict and responsibility frames
resulted in a strong narrative to shape public opinion to be favorable to proceeding into
war in Afghanistan. If the public had been more aware of the historic U.S. involvement in
the country, including previous support for the mujahedeen fighters against the Soviets,
public opinion could have perhaps shaped different policies to guide the U.S.
As noted in the introduction, the war in Afghanistan has cost the United States
thousands of American lives and billions of dollars. And, the question remains, is
America any safer for this effort? Is Afghanistan any better off? The answer, regrettably,
is not so much. The United States war in Afghanistan has brought progress in some areas,
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but the U.S. mission has expanded, the Taliban remains powerful, and poor governance,
and conflict are widespread. Afghan national security forces, the linchpin of the U.S. exit
strategy, offer no guarantee of future stability (Waldman, 2013).
Since the U.S. invasion, Afghanistan has experienced faltering reconstruction as
the region has been plagued by insurgency and Islamic extremism. Presently, an
accelerated timetable for U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan threatens to leave an
intensified civil war in its wake (Waldman, 2013). Taking these outcomes into account,
the American public could have been better informed about the history and relationship
between the United States and Afghanistan. A better-informed public, armed with lessons
from history, could have had the opportunity to influence the U.S. government for
different policy decisions at the onset of the war.
However, as demonstrated by this research study, as well as others cited here, the
news media did not extensively provide historical context in the lead up to the war. As
demonstrated in this thesis, the three historic television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS,
did not provide a historical framework in the lead up to the war. Instead, they shaped the
narrative of coverage following the attacks of September 11 by providing a steady
drumbeat on the path to war, using conflict and responsibility frames. Therefore, the war
in Afghanistan became lumped into the larger, more nebulous “War on Terror,” which
the U.S. is still waging today.
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Appendix A
Codebook
This codebook provides instructions and training on how to conduct the content analysis
of the morning show and evening news programs of ABC, NBC, and CBS, starting on
September 11, 2001, and ending with the outset of war in Afghanistan on October 7,
2001. It contains definitions of terms, broadcast media codes, historical reference codes,
media frame codes, as well as others.
DEFINITIONS
Conflict media frame – emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, institutions, or
countries
Human interest media frame – brings a human face, an individual’s story, or an
emotional angle to the presentation of an event, issue, or problem
Attribution of responsibility media frame – presents an issue or problem in such a way
as to attribute responsibility for causing or solving to either the government or to an
individual or group
Morality media frame – interprets an event or issue in the context of religious tenets or
moral prescriptions
Economic consequences media frame – presents an event, problem, or issue in terms of
the economic consequences it will have on an individual, group, institution, region, or
country.
White House official – President, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Counselor to
the President, Senior Advisors, Press Secretary and Deputy Press Secretaries.
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Cabinet-level official – Vice President of the United States, Secretary of State, Secretary
of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Interior, Secretary of
Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation,
Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
Pro-war comment– in favor of supporting the invasion of Afghanistan and war
Anti-war comment – opposed to war and the invasion of Afghanistan
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CODING
Column(s)

Variable

1-2

Number assigned to each coder

4

Broadcast media
1 = ABC’s evening news
2 = NBC’s evening news
3 = CBS’s evening news
4 = Any special network news program that did not air during the regular morning
or evening news timeslots

5

Broadcasting date
Enter date as month, date, and year of the broadcasted segment. For example,

09/11/01.

6

Type of historical reference made during the broadcast segment
1 = No historical reference
2 = U.S. support for the Afghan mujahedeen (freedom fighters) during the 1980s
Afghan-Soviet conflict
3 = previous World Trade Center bombing in 1993
4 = 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
5 = bombing of the guided missile destroyer USS Cole in 2000
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6 = other historical reference (Afghan-related)
7 = other historical reference (non-Afghan-related)
8 = more than one historical reference made

7

Media frame used during the broadcasted segment
1 = none of these frames was used
2 = conflict
3 = human interest
4 = attribution of responsibility
5 = morality
6 = economic consequences
7 = more than one of these frames was used

8

Official comment from a White House or Cabinet member on public policy
towards Afghanistan made during the broadcast segment
1 = No official quote/attributed statement or comment from a White House or
Cabinet member
2 = Direct quote from a White House or Cabinet member repeated verbatim by a
news anchor
3 = Attributed statement or comment from a White House or Cabinet member
repeated by a news anchor
4 = Direct quote from a White House or Cabinet member made by the official
themselves during an on-camera interview
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9

If an official comment from a White House or Cabinet member on public policy
towards Afghanistan was made during the broadcast segment, please classify the
comment as pro-war or anti-war
1 = Neither pro-war or anti-war
2 = Pro-war
3 = Anti-war

10

Placement of Afghan-related segment within the broadcast evening news show
(shows are 30 minutes each)
1 = Mentioned within the first 15 minutes of the broadcast
2 = Mentioned within the last 15 minutes of the broadcast
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Appendix B
Coding Sheet
Below is the format for recording data for this content analysis so that it is suitable for
depositing into a data archive for statistical review. For each category to be reviewed,
numbers were used for coding the data. Please refer to the codebook for the variables
being measured along with term definitions.
If you have any questions regarding how to use this coding sheet, please contact the
researcher, Bobbie Maynard, at bfmynard@memphis.edu.
Assigned coder number:
1

2

________________________________________________________________________
Broadcast media:
1

2

3

4

________________________________________________________________________
Broadcasting date:
________________________________________________________________________
Type of historical reference made during the broadcast segment:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

________________________________________________________________________
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Media frame used during the broadcast segment:
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

________________________________________________________________________
Official comment from a White House or Cabinet member on public policy toward
Afghanistan made during the broadcast segment
1

2

3

4

________________________________________________________________________
If an official comment from a White House or Cabinet member on public policy toward
Afghanistan was made during the broadcast segment, please classify the comment as prowar or anti-war
1

2

3

________________________________________________________________________
Placement of Afghan-related segment within the broadcast evening news show
1

2

________________________________________________________________________
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